原文译文操作

Micah Rosenbloom Crunch Network Contributor

Micah Rosenbloom is a venture partner at Founder Collective.

More posts by this contributor:

How to join the network


Startups like Warby Parker, Bonobos and Casper have proven that it’s possible to build a modern brand predominately using digital tools. As a result, a flood of early-stage tech VCs have barged into the market like Walmart shoppers on Black Friday.

Andy Dunn of Bonobos recently christened this class of company as Digitally Native Vertical Brands, or “DNVBs.” His basic definition of a DNVB is “a brand born on and primarily experienced via the internet that features a vertically-oriented business model which combines the margin of the retailer and brand.” It’s a great definition of the “Warby for X” phenomena.

创业公司像 Warby Parker, Bonobos and Casper已经证明,建立主要使用数字工具的现代品牌是可能的。因此,大量的早期科技风投闯入市场就像沃尔玛购物者在黑色星期五那样。

Bonobos的Andy Dunn最近命名为这类公司为Digitally Native Vertical Brands, 或“DNVBs.” 他对 DNVB的基本定义是 “一个品牌诞生,主要经历了互联网,具有垂直导向的商业模式,结合了零售商和品牌的利润率.” 这是“Warby for X”现象的一个非常好的定义。

 

纠正翻译

Many of these companies have far surpassed typical growth expectations for a CPG company. We’ve seen DNVBs reach $100 million in sales in a couple of years in a variety of categories — eyeglasses, razors, mattresses and food, just to name a few. However, these brands need to respect certain set irrefutable laws of retail physics: exit caps, modest multiples and price erosion in the face of slowing growth and increasing competition.

Respect the absolute exit cap

I see many founders negotiating huge funding rounds at eye-popping valuations without taking the time to ask what that valuation entails. Many founders are signing term sheets that will implicitly require them to become the leader in their industry, often by a wide margin, to justify the price. Smart founders are very cognizant of this reality, price themselves conservatively and raise capital consistent with the most likely exits.

许多这样的公司已经远远超过了典型CPG公司的增长预期,我们看到DNVBS在几年内达到了1亿美元的销售额,出售的商品种类包括眼镜、剃须刀、床垫和食品,当这是一部分。然而,这些品牌需要尊重某些既定的零售物理定律:出口上限,面对缓慢的增长和日益激烈的竞争,适度的开连锁店以及降价。

尊重绝对产品出口上限

我看到许多创办人在令人瞠目结舌的估值上谈判巨额融资,却不花时间去问估值是什么。许多创建者正在签署含蓄地要求他们成为行业领导者的条款表,通常以较高的利润来定价。聪明的创始人非常了解这个现实,, 谨慎地定价按照可能最多的产品出口筹集资金。

纠正翻译

This is a key reality founders need to internalize. The buyers in old-line CPG markets tend not to make splashy acquisitions — you don’t hear about Coach buying a new handbag line for $2 billion. The stock market doesn’t reward big acquisitions in these categories as they often do with Silicon Valley giants, and they’re expected to justify these purchases, at least partially, on financials. This massively constrains the realm of possible outcomes.

Nailing the right product and brand messaging isn’t easy — it’s more art than science.

For instance, if the largest company in a space has a market cap of $2 billion, it will be almost impossible for them to pay $1 billion to buy a competitor. Even $500 million is a stretch. Maybe $200 million, but many startups price themselves out of that price range. There are virtually no pre-revenue acquisitions in these markets. Founders can handwave past many VCs, but acquirers will be much more focused on your gross profitability rather than grand visions.

创始人需要充分认识这个现实,老式CpG市场的收购方倾向于做不引人注目的收购——你不知道Coach花20亿美元收购了一个新的手提包生产线。股市不会像对硅谷巨头们那样,对这些类别的大型售给进行奖励, 他们希望能证明这些收购,至少在金融方面是正当的,这极大地限制了可能结果的范围。

选定正确的产品和推广品牌并不容易——与其说是科学,不如说是艺术。

举个例子,某领域的最大公司有20亿美元的市场上限,它就不可能花10亿美元去收购竞争对手。甚至连5亿都不会花,大概2亿美元, 但许多初创公司的自我定价都超过这个范围。 在这些市场上几乎不会在公司没有年收入的状况下进行收购。创始人可以和许多风投公司侃侃而谈,但收购者将更注重你的总体盈利能力,而非宏大的愿景。

纠正翻译

There is money to be made in these categories, but if overly financed, these businesses will fail to yield a return to investors, employees and founders. Consider that most big CPG brands of the last decade or so were largely bootstrapped, e.g. Chobani.

“Meh” multiples

Big exits are even harder to come by when you consider the average exit multiple for a branded company, and e-commerce more generally, isn’t great.

Take a company like ThinkGeek. It was an e-commerce company that sold tchotchkes to nerds based on licensed properties like Star Wars and Minecraft. They also designed and sourced many of their products. It’s not a stretch to say the company was a DNVB for geek culture. They were ultimately acquired for $140 million by GameStop. This sounds like a great win for a niche e-commerce brand, but they also had revenues of over $140 million — a 1X multiple.

在接受风投和收购中可以赚钱,但如果过度融资,这些企业将无法回报投资者、雇员和创始人。想想过去十年的最大的CpG品牌在很大程度上是自力更生的的,例如Chobani.

“无聊的” 倍数

当你考虑一个品牌公司的平均出口连锁店数量,更大的出口更难得到,而电商普遍更是不好。

举个像ThinkGeek一样的例子。这是一家经星际大战呢和MiCeCrand的许可,向宅男们出售周边的电商公司 ,他们还设计和采购了许多产品。这不是说这家公司是极客文化的拥护者,它们最终被GameStop以1.4亿美元的价格收购。 这听上去像一个唯利是图的电商公司的巨大胜利,但该公司的年收入也在1.4亿美元的一倍以上。

纠正翻译

Tech companies earn big multiples when they build an asset that is deeply technical (e.g. Cruise Automation) or has huge network effects (e.g. Snapchat). Absent a similar differentiator, DNVBs and e-commerce companies will garner non-tech multiples in the 1-4X sales range.

As such, founders need to build more revenue in order to justify a larger sale. Unfortunately, many founders raise capital to finance that growth, which in turn increases the size of the exit required to make a sale work.

Respect the laws of DNVB physics

A founder said to me the other day, “You’re the first VC in three years to ask to see a model.” Many early-stage VCs seem to think it’s taboo to ask for a model. There has been a pervasive belief that “traditional metrics don’t apply.” Taken to the extreme, this is dangerous.

当科技公司建立一种深度技术(例如Cruise Automation) 或拥有巨大的网络效应(例如Snapchat)的技术产品. ,它就可以一本万利。如果没有类似的差异,DNVBs和电子商务公司将达到1-4倍的非技术性销售额。

因此,创立者需要创造更多的收入,以证明更大的销售额。不幸的是,许多创始人筹集资金来提高销售额增长,这反过来又增加了销售工作所需的产品出口尺寸。

尊重从属定律

一位创始人前几天对我说。, “你是三年来第一个要求看模型的风投公司。” 许多早期的风险投资公司似乎认为征求一个模型是禁忌,人们普遍认为“传统的评估标准不适用”。

纠正翻译

We shouldn’t make our decisions solely off models, but they help illuminate the way a founder thinks about their business. The math is necessary to ensure that everyone can win along the way. These types of DNVB businesses live and die based on their models.

Founders can’t rely on viral coefficients, strong network effects or deep technology moats to justify stratospheric valuations. Instead, they need enough gross margin to ensure that they can afford ever-increasing acquisition costs and create enough cashflow to fund expansion.

It varies by business, but DNVB startups generally need 2-3X the acquisition cost in margin to succeed. The CEOs of DNVBs obsess over creating the perfect Facebook ad featuring photogenic models, but they really need to spend more time honing their financial model in Excel.

我们不应该仅仅依靠模型来做决定,,但它们有助于启发创始人对自己业务的思考方式。数学是必要的,以确保每个人都能在途中获胜,DNVB业务类型的存亡取决于它们的模型。

创始人不能依赖传播系数,强大的网络效应或者技术深度来评估平流层估值。相反, 他们需要足够的毛利率,以确保他们能够承受不断增加的收购成本并创造足够的现金流去扩张储备。

由于业务的不同,DNVB初创公司通常需要2-3x的边际成本来获得成功。DNVBS的首席执行官们迷恋于创建完美的脸谱网广告,其特征是美颜拍照模式,但他们确实需要花更多的时间在Excel中锤炼他们的财务模型。

纠正翻译

Only so many bags or shoes can possibly be sold.

If you’ve built a genuinely disruptive market leader or if you have a Bezos-esqe ability to leverage public markets, you can ignore this advice. However, if you’re in a business that’s more likely to be acquired than IPO, you need to start thinking carefully about who the acquirers in your business are, what their track record of acquisitions look like and what kinds of prices they tend to pay.

In the more traditional tech world, one can paint a picture of an uncapped future. Facebook has the ability to monetize a seemingly infinite amount of content. On the other hand, the market for goods is finite. Only so many bags or shoes can possibly be sold, and this presents inherent market caps and thus, exit caps.

只有这么多的包或鞋可能被卖掉。

如果你已经成为了了一个真正的颠覆性市场领导者,或者如果你有Bezos-esqe的能力来经营公共市场,你可以忽略这个建议。然而,如果你在一个比IPO更容易被收购的企业,你需要开始仔细考虑你的生意伙伴是谁,他们的收购记录是什么样的,他们倾向于支付什么样的价格。

在更传统的技术世界,人们可以描绘一个拥有无限可能的未来。脸谱网有能力将看似无限量的内容货币化。另一方面,商品市场是有限的。只有这么多的袋子或鞋子有可能被卖掉,这带来了固有的市场上限,即出口上限。

maritime law enforcement

纠正翻译

Capital efficiency is key

Fortunately, capital is available for these DNVBs. There will be a whole new generation of great brands created in the coming years. There are many great investors leaning into these opportunities, including us. But I’d suggest that founders in these categories look for modest valuations and bootstrap as much as possible. Loot Crate bootstrapped its way to 600,000 subscribers and $100 million in revenue — you can too. Leverage Kickstarter or Indiegogo as much as possible — Misfit got its start on Indiegogo and ultimately sold for a quarter billion dollars.

资本效率是关键

幸运的是,资本对这些DNVBs有用。一代全新的伟大的品牌,将在未来几年崛起。有很多厉害的投资者抓住这些机遇包括我们。但我建议创业者们在这些类别中寻求适度的估值并尽可能的获益。 “哄抢箱”拥有600000用户和1亿美元的收入——你也可以。尽可能的利用Kickstarter或Indiegogo—— Misfit开始于Indiegogo,最终以一季度一亿美元卖出。

纠正翻译

Nailing the right product and brand messaging isn’t easy — it’s more art than science. Building a model is equally hard, but is within reach of anyone who can open a spreadsheet. Take the time upfront to get that right rather than rush to raise capital. Learn to love the laws of retail, or you’ll learn the hard lesson that today’s hot seller is tomorrow’s bargain bin special.

Thanks to Andy Dunn and Philip Krim for reviewing early drafts of this post.

Featured Image: BLACKDAY/Shutterstock

抓住正确的产品和品牌信息并不容易——它更像艺术而非科学。建立一个模型同样很难,但可以在每个能够打开电子表格的人的范围内建立。前期应该多花时间以获得权利,而不是急于筹集资金。学会热爱零售业的法律,否则你会得到惨痛的教训,今天的热卖产品将是明天的特价商品。

感谢安迪·邓恩和菲利普克里米亚审阅这篇文章的早期草稿。

精选图片: BLACKDAY/Shutterstock

纠正翻译